This paper explores the potential role of industrial policy to stimulate post-crisis recovery in South East Europe (SEE). Policy reactions in the region have focused on fiscal consolidation and austerity, while the design of active industrial policies to improve competitiveness has been less in evidence. The paper reviews the experience of industrial policies in the EU and shows how these policies have evolved from vertical to horizontal approaches, and how the latter versions of policy have been transferred to the accession states in SEE. The paper reviews the evolution of industrial policies in eight countries of the region and the impact of these policies on industrial production. It argues that the horizontal industrial policies that have been imposed on SEE countries through conditionality embodied in the EU accession process have left their economies vulnerable to adverse spillovers from the eurozone crisis. It concludes with an assessment of the relevance of industrial policies to economic recovery, and questions whether SEE has been 'shut out' of the 'fresh' vertical industrial policy that has been adopted by the EU in recent years.
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Introduction
Following the global economic crisis, the limitations of unregulated freemarket capitalism have become apparent. The rise of the financial sector as a dominant force in many developed economies over the last two decades has been accompanied by widespread de-industrialisation and has left these economies vulnerable to destructive financial bubbles (Bellamy-Foster and Magdoff, 2009) . Following the crisis, there has been a loss of confidence in the prescriptions of neo-liberal economic thought that prescribed a strong reliance on the market and the withdrawal of the state from active intervention in the economy to promote industrial development. As yet, however, no alternative growth model has been proposed which has won widespread acceptance.
The most recent permutation of the global crisis within the eurozone and its periphery has seen the transference of private sector indebtedness to the state, leading to soaring budget deficits that have required widespread and unpopular cuts in public expenditures (Pisany-Ferry, 2013) . Policy reactions in EU member states have focused on supporting the financial sector though banking union combined with a macro-economic policy package involving tight fiscal discipline implemented through the imposition of tough austerity packages and strengthened economic governance, while the design of active industrial policies to improve competitiveness have been less in evidence.
Faced with the need to raise labour productivity and international competitiveness so that renewed economic growth could underpin a sustained reduction of government deficits, countries in the European periphery are bereft of suitable policy instruments apart from 'internal devaluation'. It is in this context that finding a suitable form of industrial policy is once again on the agenda promoted by the European Commission, which has called for a 'fresh approach' to industrial policy as a means to promote recovery from the economic crisis in the EU (EC, 2010) .
The economies of South East Europe (SEE) have been severely affected by the global economic crisis (Bartlett and Prica, 2011) and face similar challenges of as the rest of Europe in finding an appropriate policy response 1 . So far, the economic policies that have been adopted in SEE have been broadly conservative, being initially stimulative in allowing budget deficits to increase from relatively low levels, but subsequently restrictive with deep cuts in public expenditure to constrain the emerging deficits (Cviic and Sanfey, 2010) .
The IMF has intervened with conditional loans in the worst affected counties such as Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia and Romania and more recently in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (henceforth "Macedonia").
Monetary policy was initially loosened in countries that experienced rapid reversals of credit growth, such as Croatia, but later tightened where the pegged exchange rates were threatened as in the case of Macedonia. These difficult economic conditions have continued as a result of spillover from the continuing crisis in the Eurozone leading to double-dip recessions in some countries. In response, aggressive fiscal austerity policies have been applied in the 'super-periphery' countries of SEE similar to those imposed on other peripheral countries of the EU (Bartlett and Prica, 2013) . However, there has been no sign of an accompanying renewal of industrial policy as a remedy for economic recession in any of these countries (Cerović et al., 2014) .
This paper explores the role of industrial policy as a potential means to stimulate economic revival in South East Europe. In the next section, the paper reviews how industrial policies in the EU and the USA followed similar policy evolutions from a 'vertical' approach in the immediate post-war period under the Keynesian consensus, to a 'horizontal' approach in the period following the Reagan-Thatcher neoliberal ascendancy. Within the class of horizontal industrial policies, it distinguishes thos designed to promote business networks and industrial clusters from those designed to promote the knowledge economy and innovation systems. Section 3 turns to the analysis of industrial policy and performance in SEE and argues that the region has been driven by the process of Europeanisation to make an equivalent shift from vertical to horizontal industrial polices. Sections 4 through 6 detail the evolution of industrial policies in each of eight SEE countries, taking in turn three groups of countries distinguished by their accession status: new member states, candidate states and potential candidates 2 . Section 7 reviews the recent return of EU industrial policy towards a vertical approach through the 'fresh' industrial policy adopted at the start of the 2010s in response to the eurozone crisis. Section 8 concludes with an assessment of the horizontal industrial policies that have been adopted in SEE in recent years, and argues that these policies have been incapable of supporting economic recovery in which industrial capacity has been diminished by the long years of transitional recession and undermined by the horizontal industrial policy that they have been obliged to implement as a condition of the EU accession process. The section concludes that the SEE countries are likely to be effectively "shut out" of the EU's fresh approach to industrial policy due to this lack of capacity for high technology industrial production.
2. Industrial Policies in the EU and USA-from Vertical to
Horizontal
After the end of the Second World War, most governments in Western Europe adopted active industrial polices to stimulate post-war economic recovery.
Industrial policy was used to direct state support to favoured industries, guided by various sorts of planning. The most active proponent of this approach was the French government, which adopted a formal planning approach to support selected industrial sectors and build 'national champions' (Cohen, 2007) . Governments also channelled development funds into less developed regions, focusing on infrastructure projects and subsidies to large-scale industries to support the development of regions in decline.
In the late 1980s, with the creation of the EU Single Market, this 'vertical' industrial policy lost favour as the Reagan-Thatcher economic policies emphasised the withdrawal of the state from economic management, the privatisation of state owned enterprises, a greater reliance on market forces and the creation of a business friendly 'investment climate' in which the spontaneous forces of the market would decide which industries or sectors would prosper, and which would fall by the wayside. The new 'horizontal' approach to industrial policy saw a role for the state in supervising an enabling environment for business growth, by setting out the rules of the game, ensuring the rule of law, and generally creating a market free of preferential subsidies in which all could compete on an equal basis. The old idea of 'picking winners' from the era of vertical industrial policy was derided as infeasible and ineffective and was replaced by a wave of economic liberalisation. The new emphasis was on competition policy, which it was thought would eliminate or at least significantly reduce state aid to industry, and on promoting horizontal measures to establish a level playing field for companies across the Single Market.
In the 1990s the focus of such a horizontal industrial policy shifted further away from sectoral industrial policies towards decentralised territorial policies embodied in the EU regional policy and the activities of the European Regional Development Fund (Begg and Mayes, 2000) . This emphasised the fostering of 'regional competitiveness', and led to the creation of programmes of regional development that embodied new formulations of horizontal industrial policy such as (i) support for small and medium sized enterprises at a local level through the creation of decentralised business networks and industrial clusters and (ii) an emphasis on 'regional innovation systems', the 'knowledge economy' and 'knowledge transfer' from public research and higher education institutions to the business sector (Cooke, 2001) .
Business networks and industrial clusters
Business networking and industrial clusters were at the heart of this new horizontal industrial policy approach within which small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) became an increasing focus of attention. Italian industrial districts became a paradigm for a new form of economic development based upon a dense networking and clustering of small firms in specific geographic locations. Drawing on the research evidence from the 'Third Italy' as well as other regions in which industrial districts had been observed, such as BadenWürttemberg in Germany, Cooke and Morgan (1993) identified a new "network paradigm" in which the spatial dimension of inter-firm networking was of key importance. Stabher et al. (1995) showed how programmes to support business networking had been widely developed as a tool for regional industrial policy. Inter-firm networks were also identified as an important element for decentralised industrial policy in transition economies where rapidly changing economic conditions led to the emergence of new and more flexible industrial economies to replace the old obsolete hierarchical industrial structures (Franičević and Bartlett, 2001 ).
Viewed from a policy perspective, the recognition of the importance of interfirm networks and their geographical concentration led to the emergence of the notion of industrial clusters as a policy device. If such clusters had been so effective in the Third Italy and elsewhere, could governments seeking to promote economic growth and development create them artificially? The influential work of Michael Porter stimulated an increased policy interest in the beneficial effects of industrial clusters, and governments rushed to introduce new industrial cluster programmes with subsidies to support them.
However, few of these initiatives proved to be successful. As Feldman et al. The new emphasis by the Commission on innovation and the knowledge economy chimed with the voluminous academic research into regional innovation systems. This had argued that differences in innovative capacities between countries and regions are linked to the 'thickness' of institutions that promote learning and the transfer of technology (Morgan, 1997) . Porter (2000) argued that industrial clusters would benefit from knowledge transfer from local universities. Policy makers began to support programmes to facilitate links between high technology companies and institutions of higher education. Universities were encouraged to set up programmes to enable academics and students to establish high-tech spin-off companies to commercialise the results of their scientific inventions. Yet the use of spin-offs as a mechanism of knowledge transfer is not without its drawbacks and difficulties. Evidence from several studies showed that only a minority of spin-offs could be expected to have growth potential (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004) , while in the absence of adequate support spin-offs may remain stuck at a too small scale of operation (Degroof and Roberts, 2004) . Moreover, spinoffs may find it hard to raise either outside equity capital or loan funds to finance their activities (Lerner, 2004) and they typically lack the managerial expertise needed to exploit the commercial potential of their technologies (Wright et al., 2004) .
Spin-off companies are often located in science or technology parks based either within or close to a university or research institute. Some early empirical evidence suggested that the level of interaction between firms in such science and technology parks and their local universities is generally low . Cooperation between firms in a park may also be less than one might expect Johanisson, 1998) , which may be due to the heterogeneity of the firms in a Park (Lowengren-Williams, 2000) .
Nevertheless, interactions between park-based companies may be greater than among other firms (Felsenstein, 1994) . Lindelöf and Löfsten carried out an empirical study of 265 new technology firms in ten science parks in Sweden, and compared these with a matched sample of off-park firms. They found stronger links to universities, higher levels of technological innovation, and higher rates of growth in firms located in parks compared to off-park firms.
Such decentralised industrial policies were not confined to Europe, but were also adopted in the USA. Shrank (2009) 
Trends in industrial performance
By the end of the 1990s, the region had witnessed a sharp reduction in the share of output produced and workers employed by the industrial sector (Bartlett, 2009) . As shown in Figure 1 , the share of industry in gross value added (GVA) continued to fall in most countries of South East Europe with the early adoption of a neoliberal economic policy that exposed the wood manufacturing industry in the North East of the country to exceptional external competition, leading to its rapid demise (Bartlett and Šišević, 2013) .
Its share of industrial production in GVA is therefore far below that of other countries of the region and has fallen further in recent years. Over the last decade, the share of manufacturing sector share in GVA has followed a similar path to that of industrial production. In Croatia and Serbia the share of manufacturing followed the long-term secular decline of manufacturing in the EU-27 rather closely As shown above, a main element of the horizontal approach to industrial policy has been its focus on increasing the innovative capacity of the economy, and on support for high-growth innovative small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) which it has been argued have played an important role in underpinning economic growth in transition countries (Radosevic, 2002) . An influential argument developed by Radosevic (2004) and others is that while growth in the early stages of transition depended on a reallocation of resources from large low-productivity state firms to higher productivity firms in the emerging private sector, improvements in economic growth in later phases of transition depend on the pace of innovation and the development of a knowledge-based economy. Yet, state expenditure on R&D in the transition economies of SEE has been systematically below the average in the EU (see average. Slovenia has adopted a supportive and long-term set of policy instruments to support innovation, with greater focus than in most other countries of SEE Bukvič, 2006, OECD, 2013) . In Croatia, where a less conscious policy focus on innovation has characterised policymaking (Bartlett and Čučković, 2006 ) the GERD ratio has fallen over time towards the far lower levels typical in Bulgaria and Romania, where it has hovered around just 0.5% over the last decade.
Industrial Policy in the EU Member States in SEE Slovenia
As in other transition countries in SEE in the first wave of the EU's Eastern enlargement, Slovenia adopted a gradualist approach to privatisation. Even at the point of accession to the EU in 2004, the main state owned banks had not been privatised. In fact, privatisation in Slovenia resulted perversely in greater state control, since most firms allegedly privatised were bought out by state funds and by state-sponsored privatisation investment funds (Pahor et al., 2004) . In the run-up to EU accession, the Slovenian policy changed to a greater emphasis on horizontal industrial policies and the removal of subsidies and state aids for industry in keeping with the EU acquis (Šuštar, 2004 Slovenia has also been an exception to the general early avoidance of horizontal industrial policy (Bartlett, 2000) . Early in the transition process, Slovenia established a number of measures designed to support local economic development by supporting SMEs with interest rate subsidies and other supportive measures. The focus of the policy was on the search for potentially fast growth firms that could be supported by the state through the main SME agency: the Small Business Development Centre.
In keeping with the horizontal approach to industrial policy, Slovenia adopted a programme for developing industrial clusters involving companies and research institutes, beginning with a pilot programme in (Palčič et al., 2010 . One of the aims was to promote knowledge transfer from research institutes to the companies in the clusters. The programme provided co-financing for the costs of the initial phase of creation of clusters, for the preparation of a joint development strategy, and for the costs incurred during the first two years of their operations. Industrial policy focused on support for small firm clusters and networks, through a decentralised system of support for innovation using technology parks and university-sponsored spin-offs (Bartlett and Bukvič, 2006) .
Bulgaria
Bulgaria had a legacy of investment in high tech industries from the communist era when it specialised in computer industries. Although the large firms mainly collapsed in the 1990s, a significant number of high tech SMEs emerged with some support from the state (Bartlett and Rangelova, 1996) . By As one of the priority measures for implementing horizontal polices, the However, state aid continued to be offered to the industry sector despite the broad orientation towards pro-market transition policies, and it has even increased in recent years. The challenge facing the countries of South East Europe wishing to follow this "high path" to industrial renaissance will be to engage with this new agenda, and make a significant contribution to the new industrial sectors at the European level. Unfortunately, the SEE countries are no longer able to contribute to the high technology industries that this approach targets because their industrial capacity has been diminished by the long years of transitional recession, and undermined by the horizontal industrial policy that they have been obliged to implement as a condition of the EU accession process. Reversing this will involve extensive industrial upgrading and adoption of new technologies in targeted industries within the group of sectors identified by the European Commission as the future industrial champions of the EU. In the absence of such engagement, the economies of the region will be held back from involvement in the leading sectors of European industry, and will be effectively "shut out" of the EU's fresh approach to industrial policy.
The alternative for the SEE countries seems to be to manoeuvre as best as possible within the constraints of EU competition policy to ensure that the adopted horizontal measures and decentralised industrial policies at local and regional level are well supported by the central government, and to make best use of EU assistance and funding opportunities. This "low path" industrial policy requires effective fiscal decentralisation to provide local authorities with sufficient funds to meet the challenges of local economic development, ensuring effective ministerial coordination and effective partnership between local administrations and business organisations at the local level, an orientation that is still to be developed in most countries in the region. Case studies should be carried out in a number of these zones to investigate the extent to which they may provide support for a technology upgrading strategy linking local and EU high technology companies in a new wave of industrial development in the region. Factors contributing to the success or failure of these new initiatives should be identified and best practice examples identified to provide a guide to the policy makers involved in designing effective industrial policies to support future economic growth in the Europe's less developed South East region.
